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A Right of Passage: The Implications of the Tenth 
Circuit’s Ruling in First Unitarian v. Salt Lake City 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The classic “bundle of sticks” metaphor in property law holds that 
property is, in essence, a bundle of rights that can be severed, sold, 
bequeathed, or devised. This analogy “is a combination of Wesley 
Hohfeld’s analysis of rights and A.M. Honoré’s description of the 
incidents of ownership.”1 Hohfeld argues that property rights are a 
culmination of individual rights valid against all other owners. Honoré 
described property law not only as the rights associated with owning 
property but the duties, liabilities, and other aspects associated with 
owning property; thus, property is not only a list of rights, but a 
culmination of relations and obligations.2 Scholars disagree about all the 
rights included in the bundle, but those most commonly identified 
“include the right to exclude others, the right to possess, the right to use, 
and the right to alienate (or transfer or dispose of).”3 
The question raised in First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. 
Salt Lake City Corp. is whether a city can retain and restrict a stick in the 
bundle of property rights in a publicly held street that is sold to a private 
entity. More specifically, does a city have the “authority to prohibit all 
expressive activities on a public easement it reserved across otherwise 
private property, except for the speech permitted by the private owner of 
the underlying estate?”4 In answering this question, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided that Main Street Plaza in downtown Salt Lake 
City, a privately owned park that was a former street, is a public forum 
and, therefore, a restrictive easement placed on the Plaza violated the 
First Amendment. 
After providing the background and context for First Unitarian, this 
note will address the right of states to create restrictive easements and the 
interrelation between the First Amendment and property rights in Utah. 
 
 1. J. E. Penner, “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996). 
 2. Id. at 713. 
 3. Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 285-286 (2002). 
 4. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1121 
(10th Cir. 2002). 
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In section IV, the comment will look at First Amendment analysis of the 
forum doctrine and its application in a marquee Tenth Circuit case: 
Hawkins v. City & County of Denver. This section will also include an 
analysis of the Second Circuit’s competing conclusion in Hotel 
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Parks 
& Recreation. In section V, the Note will challenge the Tenth Circuit’s 
reasoning in reaching the conclusion that Main Street Plaza should be 
considered a public forum. In addition, the Note will discuss the 
implications of the ruling and the ramifications for the future of both 
government property rights and individual First Amendment rights in the 
Tenth Circuit. Through examining First Unitarian it will be shown that 
the Tenth Circuit’s ruling is too far reaching and that governments 
should be able to terminate public forums while retaining a non-public 
forum easement. 
II.  CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF FIRST UNITARIAN V. SALT LAKE 
CITY 
A.  History of the Case 
On April 13, 1999, the Salt Lake City Council approved the closure 
and sale of a portion of Main Street to The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (“the Church”) subject to a restrictive easement.5 The 
easement was “planned and improved so as to maintain, encourage, and 
invite public use.”6 The City of Salt Lake (“the City”) recorded a 
warranty deed and reservation of easement that included the right of the 
Church to prevent uses of the property other than pedestrian use. The 
deed restricted certain forms of speech, lewd conduct, and activities such 
as smoking, skateboarding, and rollerblading.7 Those opposed to the 
 
 5. Alan Edwards, S.L. Plaza Gets Green Light: Council Votes to Sell 2-Acre Stretch to LDS 
Church, DESERET NEWS, April 14, 1999, at A1. 
 6. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Aplt. App. Vol. I at 191). 
 7. Id. at 1118-1119 (quoting Aplt. App. Vol. I at 362). 
The reservation contains the following restrictions with respect to the use of the 
easement: 2.2 Right to Prevent Uses Other Than Pedestrian Passage. Nothing in the 
reservation of use of this easement shall be deemed to create or constitute a public forum, 
limited or otherwise on the Property. Nothing in this easement is intended to permit any 
of the following enumerated or similar activities on the Property: loitering, assembling, 
partying, demonstrating, picketing, distributing literature, soliciting, begging, littering, 
consuming alcohol beverages or using tobacco products, sunbathing, carrying firearms 
(except for police personnel), erecting signs or displays, using loudspeakers or other 
devices to project music, sound or spoken messages, engaging in any illegal, offensive, 
indecent, obscene, vulgar, lewd or disorderly speech, dress or conduct, or otherwise 
disturbing the peace. Grantee shall have the right to deny access to the Property to 
persons who are disorderly or intoxicated or engaging in any of the activities identified 
above. The provisions of this section are intended to apply only to Grantor and other 
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restrictions filed suit against the City claiming a violation of the First 
Amendment.8 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) represented 
those who opposed the reservation of easement, claiming that the City 
gave preferential treatment to the Church in violation of the First 
Amendment. The Church intervened as a party to the suit.9 
To understand why the First Unitarian Church and the ACLU were 
so adamantly opposed to the restrictions placed on the easement, the 
underlying social climate of Salt Lake City must be examined. Salt Lake 
City is the world headquarters for the Church which was the driving 
force behind the settlement of Utah and the establishment of Salt Lake 
City. Consequently, the Church and its members have wielded 
significant influence over the social and political atmosphere in Salt Lake 
City. Over time, a rift has grown between some members and some non-
members of the Church who feel that the Church improperly wields 
influence over local government leaders in order to foster its own 
position. In the case at issue, Stephen Clark, counsel for the Salt Lake 
chapter of the ACLU, stated that the restrictions placed on the easement 
resulted in the City of Salt Lake “essentially preferring one religion over 
others” and that Salt Lake leaders gave “the indelible impression that the 
LDS Church occupies a privileged position in the community and that 
the City endorses the LDS Church and its messages, without any secular 
purpose.”10 The ACLU also points to the fact that a majority of the Salt 
Lake City Council members belong to the Church and that all of them 
approved of the easement.11 The City of Salt Lake has sold property to 
other churches while retaining easements in the past,12 but it is this 
underlying tension with the Church that establishes the backdrop for 
First Unitarian. 
 
users of the easement and are not intended to limit or restrict Grantee’s use of the 
Property as owner thereof, including, without limitation, the distribution of literature, the 
erection of signs and displays by Grantee, and the projection of music and spoken 
messages by Grantee. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 8. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155 
(D. Utah 2001) (naming The First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City, Utahns for Fairness, Utah 
National Organization for Women, and Craig S. Axford as plaintiffs in the suit). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Rebecca Walsh, ACLU Suit Says City Railroaded LDS Easement, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
March 2, 2000, at D3. 
 11. Mormons Purchase Portion of Utah Public Street, Create Code of Conduct, AP, May 5, 
1999, available at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=8668. 
 12. Salt Lake City Attorney Defends Sale of Street to Mormon Church, AP, May 5, 1999, 
available at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=8650 (Salt Lake 
City Attorney Roger Cutler noting that since 1986, the city has sold portions of over forty-nine city 
streets for a value of $1.8 million. Included were sales to the Catholic, Baptist and Lutheran 
churches.) 
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At the district court level, summary judgment was granted for the 
City on all counts stating that the property had so changed through the 
sale of the property, as to extinguish the public forum and thus create a 
non-public forum.13 District Judge Stewart also determined that the 
restrictions placed upon the property were content neutral, and, therefore, 
the restrictions placed on the easement did not violate the First 
Amendment.14 Judge Stewart, speaking of the case, stated that “[t]his 
raises serious concerns about the plaintiffs’ free speech rights and private 
property rights. But in this case, we have a party that has paid fair market 
value and expended considerable money to alter the property. Free 
speech rights do not outweigh private property rights.”15 The case was 
appealed to the Tenth Circuit who disagreed with Judge Stewart’s ruling 
and analysis of the case.16 
B.  Reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in First Unitarian v. Salt Lake City 
The Tenth Circuit found that “[e]ither government ownership or 
regulation is sufficient for a First Amendment forum of some kind to 
exist.”17 The Tenth Circuit ignored the City’s property law contentions 
and Judge Stewart’s analysis and went to the First Amendment forum 
analysis implying that a deed does not free the government from 
constitutional analysis when it is a party to an easement.18 The court also 
rejected the language of the restrictive easement that indicated the intent 
of the parties not to create a public forum19 stating that “[t]he 
government cannot simply declare the First Amendment status of 
property regardless of its nature and its public use.”20 
The Court ruled that it need only decide the nature of the government 
forum and, contrary to Stewart who looked at the purpose of the 
surrounding plaza, restricted its analysis to the nature and purpose of the 
easement stating that it was the only government interest in the 
property.21 The court utilized the objective considerations outlined in 
 
 13. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 
1166, 1170-72 (D. Utah 2001) (Judge Stewart relied upon Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699-700 (1992) cited in Hawkins v. 
City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 14. First Unitarian, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-79. 
 15. Rebecca Walsh, Judge Rejects Suit Against Plaza Rules, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 3, 2001, 
at A1. 
 16. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1114. 
 17. Id. at 1122. 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. SERVITUDES §3.1 cmt. d (2000) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]. 
 19. See supra note 7. 
 20. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1124. 
 21. Id. at 1125. 
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Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee to determine the nature of the easement as a 
forum.22 The considerations include 1) whether the property retains 
similar characteristics of public forms, 2) whether government has 
granted or acquiesced in broad public access to the property, and 3) 
whether expressive activity would interfere with the intended 
government use of the property.23 The Tenth Circuit then sought to 
“determine the easement’s nature and purpose” while answering the 
question “whether expressive activity is compatible with the purposes 
and uses to which the government has lawfully dedicated the property, 
not whether the government has expressly designated speech as a 
purpose of the property.”24 
The court, after careful analysis, concluded that the easement was 
intended to be used as a “pedestrian throughway for the general 
public.”25 The court claimed that the City’s main purposes were to create 
public space in the downtown area and to generate more pedestrian 
traffic. The court also felt that the City meant to retain these rights even 
while selling the underlying land as seen through a reverter clause in the 
contract.26 The court stated that the Salt Lake City planning council had 
discussed the issue and had indicated that it would require the Church to 
regulate speech as it would in a public park.27 The court further 
determined that the City’s sale of the land was contingent on several 
factors including a provision that the easement should be “planned and 
improved so as to maintain, encourage, and invite public use.”28 The 
court focused on the City’s argument that the City would not have sold 
the land “but for” the easement.29 The court also rejected the notion that 
the easement was for ingress and egress to the Church’s two campuses 
that straddle the Main Street Plaza30 as well as the argument that since 
Main Street had been turned over the restrictions on the easement had 
been limited.31 Ultimately, the court found that the easement was a public 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699-700 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 24. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1125. 
 25. Id. at 1126. 
 26. Id. at 1119 (quoting Aplt. App. Vol. I at 362) (The reverter clause states that if the 
Church “fails to use the Property for the purposes set forth . . . or fails to maintain the property 
thereafter” ownership may revert back to the City). 
 27. Id. at 1128. 
 28. Id. at 1126. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1126-27. 
 31. Id. at 1129-1130. 
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forum and, therefore, the restrictions placed on the land violate the First 
Amendment.32 
III.  EASEMENT PROPERTY RIGHT LAW 
A.  General Concepts of Servitudes and Easements in Property Law 
The Restatement (Third) of Property provides a guideline into 
generally held property principles including servitudes.33 A servitude is a 
“legal device that creates a right or an obligation that runs with land or an 
interest in land”34 that includes easements or “a nonpossessory right to 
enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the 
possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.”35 
An easement is considered a non-possessory right because it “authorizes 
limited uses of the burdened property for a particular purpose. The holder 
of the easement or profit is entitled to make only the uses reasonably 
necessary for the specified purpose.36 
Government agencies have increasingly used privately created 
servitudes to supplement “public land-use controls and environmental 
protections, shifting development costs to the private sector, and 
providing controls and governance structures for development and 
redevelopment projects”37 in order to maximize the public good. Courts 
and legislatures have traded looking at rigid constraints on servitudes 
into “recognizing a general freedom to create servitudes”38 and “[w]here 
servitudes are clearly intended, and do not appear to be obstructing 
useful development, courts frequently apply a stronger constructional 
preference in favor of interpreting a servitude to carry out the intent and 
expectations of the parties.”39 It is recognized, however, that servitudes 
created by a governmental entity need to be reviewed under 
 
 32. Id. at 1130. 
 33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 3.1, cmt. a (recognizing that the purpose of the 
Restatement (Third) of Property is to “identify more accurately the situations in which the threatened 
risks of harm to the general welfare justify judicial intervention to invalidate properly created 
transactions intended to create interests that run with land.”). 
 34. Id. at § 1.1(1). 
 35. Id. at § 1.2(1). There are several types of easements including non-exclusive easements 
(those that allow servitude holder to exclude anyone except the servient owner or those authorized 
by the servient owner) and exclusive easements (where the servient owner is excluded from certain 
uses of the land except those that do not unreasonably interfere with uses of the servitude). Id. at § 
1.2(1), cmt. c. 
 36. Id. at § 1.2(1), cmt. d. 
 37. Id. at § 3.1, cmt. a. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
10MONTIERTH.MACRO 5/26/2004  1:12 AM 
709] SALT LAKE CITY MAIN STREET PLAZA 715 
constitutional law and if determined to violate fundamental constitutional 
rights, are subject to invalidation.40 
B.  Utah Property Law 
Utah statutes allow the state to sell public land for the public 
benefit.41 Additionally, it is generally held that “the right to control a 
[government-owned] servitude for the benefit of the public is located in 
the state.”42 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the words of a deed 
or grant determine the scope of an easement, burdening the servient 
estate only to the purposes expressed in the grant.43 Utah has established 
that deeds “should be construed so as to effectuate the intentions and 
desires of the parties, as manifested by the language made use of in the 
deed . . . . [W]hen the deed creates an easement the circumstances 
attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the object to be 
attained are also to be considered.” 44 Utah State Law has also held that 
“once the character of the easement has been fixed no material change or 
enlargement of the right acquired can be made if thereby a greater burden 
is placed on the servient estate.”45 It, therefore, may be argued that courts 
cannot “expand the terms of the easement”46 and thereby trump state law 
by allowing the easement use to be incompatible with the possessory 
estate’s main use. 
Though it has been argued that the easement is not a significant 
enough property right to require a constitutional analysis,47 the court 
determined that a constitutional analysis is appropriate whenever there is 
“government ownership or regulation.”48 However, the intent of the 
parties should be construed liberally,49 and, in this case, the court has 
 
 40. Id. at § 3.1, cmt. d. 
 41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-4-1(1) (2003) (“All state agencies may acquire land . . . and are 
authorized to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of land no longer needed for public purposes . . . .”). 
 42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 2.18(2) & cmt. b. 
 43. Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1963); Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 
225, 227 (Utah 1985) (“[T]he law in this state is plain: A right of way founded on a deed or grant is 
limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument.”). 
 44. Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1952). 
 45. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 159 P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 1945), modified on 
other grounds, 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946) (holding that a ditch company with irrigation ditches 
across individuals’ land could not cement the ditches because the envisioned purpose of the ditches 
was to include seepage of water to landowner’s surrounding land). 
 46. Labrum, 711 P.2d at 227 (holding that restrictions placed on an easement only for a right 
of way to egress and ingress to cleaning out a ditch, were the only purposes and uses for the right of 
way). 
 47. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 48. Id. 
 49. But see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (The Supreme Court noting that 
the government could not transform the sidewalks around the Supreme Court into a non-public 
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overlooked the intention of both parties as manifested in the Deed of 
Reservation of the Easement. Additionally, the court, in its First 
Amendment analysis, failed to look at the purposes of the servient estate 
or the Church’s intended use of the Main Street Plaza. The court then 
incorrectly labeled the Main Street Plaza a public forum although a 
public forum was clearly beyond the intent of the parties to the 
agreement. 
IV.  FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
A.  An Overview of First Amendment Rights with Regard to Public 
Forums 
The character of the property in issue determines the standard for 
evaluating such property.50 The purpose of a forum analysis is to 
determine whether the government’s purpose in limiting the proposed 
speech on a property outweighs private individual uses of the property.51 
There are three traditional designations for forums when dealing with the 
First Amendment: traditional public forums, government designated 
public forums, and non-public forums.52 Traditional public forums are 
those places that “by long tradition or by government fiat have been 
devoted to assembly and debate” in which “the rights of the State to limit 
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”53 Streets and parks have 
traditionally “been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”54 In these public 
forums, the government cannot prohibit all communication.55 
The second designation, government designated public forums, 
refers to forums that have not traditionally been public forums but have 
been set aside by the government as public forums. Government 
designated public forums are “governed by different standards . . . [as] 
the ‘First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply 
because it is owned or controlled by the government.’”56 The “state may 
 
forum by creating a statute). Grace is distinguishable from First Unitarian in that government 
retained possession of the land whereas the title to the Plaza was sold to a private third party. There 
is no statutory limitation placed on the land, except that the land is sold for its fair market value. 
 50. Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). 
 51. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
 52. Id. at 802. 
 53. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 54. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) 
 55. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 56. Id. at 46 (citing United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 
129 (1981)). 
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reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, 
as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to 
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s 
view.”57 The government, like private property owners, has the right to 
preserve property for lawfully dedicated purposes.58 
The last designation consists of forums that are either nonpublic 
forums or not forums. The restrictions in this group have to be 
“reasonable” in light of the purpose of the forum and such that public 
officials are not seeking to suppress an individual’s views that they 
oppose.59 
In summary, the government must permit speech in public forums. 
The government can open up additional public forums for a specific use 
and it may retain property that is not designated as a public forum. A key 
distinction in determining between a public forum and a non-public 
forum is that the former requires “general access” while the latter permits 
“selective access.”60 Neither side disputes the fact that the Main Street 
corridor was a traditional public forum before the sale.61 The dispute 
arises around the nature of the property after the sale.62 
B.  Eliminating a Public Forum 
As the Tenth Circuit noted in its opinion, Justice Kennedy set forth 
the three ways to terminate a public forum in his concurring opinion in 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.63 The three 
ways are 1) selling the property; 2) changing the property’s physical 
characteristics; or 3) changing the property’s principle use.64 The use of 
the word “or” signifies a “totality of the circumstances” analysis to 
determine whether a forum has been eliminated.65 Justice Kennedy 
posited that the government retains the right to close a public forum as 
“[o]therwise the State would be prohibited from closing a park, or 
eliminating a street or sidewalk, which no one has understood the public 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129-130 (1981). 
 59. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (quoting 
Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). 
 60. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (quoting 
Cornelius 473 U.S. at 803, 805). 
 61. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 
1165 (D. Utah 2001). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699-700 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 699-700). 
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forum doctrine to require.”66 In determining whether property retains its 
public forum status, the overarching test is that if the “objective, physical 
characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public access and 
uses that have been permitted by the government indicate that expressive 
activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses” then the 
property should be considered a public forum.67 In determining 
“objective” and “physical characteristics,” the most important 
considerations a court should look to include whether the “property 
shares physical similarities with more traditional public for[a], whether 
the government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public access to the 
property, and whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a 
significant way with the uses to which the government has, as a factual 
matter, dedicated the property.”68 
C.  Hawkins v. City and County of Denver: The Tenth Circuit’s 
Prevailing Precedent in Forum Analysis 
Hawkins v. City and County of Denver is the prevailing case in the 
Tenth Circuit dealing with forum analysis and the elimination of public 
forums.69 The Galleria is a 600-foot glass-covered converted public street 
owned by the City of Denver.70 It is flanked on both sides by three 
performing arts theaters and a public parking garage that are part of the 
Denver Performing Arts Complex (DPAC). To the north of the Galleria 
is a public access street (Fourteenth Street) and, to the south is a 
sculpture park that separates the DPAC from Speer Boulevard.71 The 
court in Hawkins noted that the Galleria serves as “an extended lobby for 
the various performing arts venues.”72 A group of musicians representing 
a local musicians’ guild protesting on the Galleria was removed by 
Denver Police. However, the demonstrating musicians were allowed to 
carry on their protest on Fourteenth Street which the city considered to 
be a public forum.73 The City of Denver admitted that the Galleria was 
open to the public74 and the court recognized “[p]ublicly owned or 
operated property does not become a ‘public forum’ simply because 
 
 66. Lee, 505 U.S. at. 699-700 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 698. 
 68. Id. at 699. 
 69. Hawkins, 170 F.3d 1281. 
 70. Id. at 1284. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1285. 
 74. Id. at 1287. 
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members of the public are permitted to come and go at will.”75 The court, 
however, ruled that the DPAC was a nonpublic forum because it was not 
a public park or analogous to a public thoroughfare.76 The mere fact the 
Galleria was constructed on a former public street does not render it a 
traditional public forum for the “government may, by changing the 
physical nature of its property, alter it to such an extent that it no longer 
retains its public forum status.”77 
The musicians’ guild claimed that the city’s restrictions favored 
some speech over others. The court stated that the speech was limited to 
that associated with the city owned DPAC78 and that leafleting and 
expressing one’s views was at “odds with the DPAC’s limited purpose as 
an entertainment venue.”79 The court also noted that the reasonableness 
of the restrictions was bolstered by the fact that up to fifty percent of the 
DPAC patrons entered the facilities using public sidewalks thus giving 
the plaintiffs other forums in which to disseminate their message.80 
D.  Differing Opinions: The Second Circuit’s Forum Analysis in Hotel 
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Department of 
Parks & Recreation 
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit’s October 9, 2002 decision, the 
Second Circuit decided a factually similar case. In Hotel Employees & 
Restaurant Employees Union of New York Department of Parks & 
Recreation, the Second Circuit concluded that Lincoln Plaza, a venue 
owned by New York City but maintained by a private entity, Lincoln 
Center Inc., was not a public forum even though there was a public 
thoroughfare across the plaza.81 
A local Union wanted to hold a rally on Lincoln Plaza. The Union’s 
application was denied by Lincoln Center, Inc. because “the proposed 
use violated its policy against non-arts related events in the Plaza.”82 The 
court held that the private entity’s ban “limiting organized public 
expression in the Plaza to artistic and performance-related events” did 
not violate the First Amendment.83 The court, in distinguishing between 
a public and non-public forum, examined the characteristic of the forum, 
 
 75. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 686 (1992)(O’Conner 
J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)). 
 76. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1288. 
 79. Id. at 1291. 
 80. Id. at 1291 n.7. 
 81. 311 F.3d 534, 539 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 82. Id. at 542. 
 83. Id. at 556. 
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the property’s use including location and purpose,84 the purpose for 
constructing the space, the regulations placed upon the property,85 and 
the traditional use of the property.86 In analyzing the forum issue, the 
court refused to consider the ‘throughfare’ across Lincoln Plaza in 
isolation, but instead analyzed the Plaza as an entire entity.87 
Through its forum analysis, the court determined that the city did not 
intend to treat Lincoln Plaza as a city park.88 Though one of the 
underlying purposes of Lincoln Plaza was to create a set of “parks and 
pedestrian thoroughfares,” this goal was never adopted as official policy 
and, therefore, was considered by the court to be a description rather than 
a legal conclusion.89 The Union argued that people often used Lincoln 
Plaza for purposes other than for simply accessing Lincoln Center and 
that the walkway through Lincoln Plaza was designed to be one of the 
“major thoroughfares” for the city.90 The court stated that even though 
the Lincoln Plaza has characteristics similar to those of a thoroughfare, 
the “location” and “purpose” of the Lincoln Plaza must still be 
examined.91 The court thought Lincoln Plaza to be the centerpiece of the 
Lincoln complex and even though the complex was designed to be open 
to passers-by “[t]he ability of pedestrians to cross the Plaza as a short-cut 
between surrounding streets is merely an incidental feature of its 
principal function as the entrance plaza for the Lincoln Center 
complex.”92 The court recognized that those who enter the Plaza have 
“entered some special type of enclave.”93 This enclave did not diminish 
individual access to surrounding parks that are open to public expression, 
thus indicating that the Plaza had a limited purpose.94 Additionally, 
because Lincoln Plaza is not surrounded by government buildings, it is 
“easily distinguished from those plazas and squares in which political 
 
 84. Id. at 547. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Id. at 546-47. 
 88. Id at 548. (“[T]he Parks Department retains exclusive scheduling authority over 
neighboring Damrosch and Dante Parks and permits organized expression in those parks.  In 
contrast, Lincoln Center, Inc., as the City’s licensee, has limited organized public speech in the plaza 
to events having an artistic or performance-related component.”) Id. at 549. 
 89. Id. at 549 n.11. (noting that a Lincoln Center document entitled “Plaza Policy & Usage 
Guidelines Revised Draft” was never adopted as official policy of the center and therefore does not 
prove intent) 
 90. Id. at 550. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)). 
 94. Id. at 551. See also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 
(1992) (“[S]eparation from acknowledged public areas may serve to indicate that the separated 
property is a special enclave, subject to greater restriction.”) 
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speech has historically been protected.”95 The Court concluded that, in 
considering the “relevant factors,”96 permitting all types of expressive 
activity “would be incompatible with its ‘intended purpose’ and ‘how the 
locale is used.’”97 
V.  FORUM ANALYSIS – FIRST UNITARIAN  V. CITY OF SALT LAKE 
The Tenth Circuit’s ruling in First Unitarian that an easement is a 
public forum98 has implicitly extended the scope of the First Amendment 
while significantly limiting state authority over property rights.99 The 
court has trumped Utah state law allowing the creation of an easement 
that is not bound by rights reserved in the deed and, ultimately, the intent 
of the parties. The Tenth Circuit’s decision is troublesome, as it 
supercedes state property law while unduly burdening the government 
entities’ ability to sell public land while trying to maximize public good. 
A.  Treatment of the Main Street Plaza as a Public Forum 
1.  The former public forum status should be eliminated through 
reservation of deed. 
The City and the Church agreed that “[n]othing in the reservation of 
use of this easement shall be deemed to create or constitute a public 
forum, limited or otherwise on the Property.”100 The agreement also 
established that the easement was to be solely for “pedestrian access and 
passage.”101 The Tenth Circuit, in considering this issue, insisted that a 
government entity cannot determine the nature of the forum for First 
Amendment rights regardless of the nature or use of the venue. The court 
took the position that a First Amendment forum analysis must be 
performed any time a government interest, including regulation and 
ownership, is at issue, regardless of express language in the parties’ 
 
 95. Hotel Employees, 311 F.3d at 552. 
 96. Id. (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998)). 
 97. Id. (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition 
Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
 98. Note that the court stated its intent was not to hold that the First Amendment applies to 
all easements, but only that the easement is open to scrutiny based upon the characteristics of the 
easement, forum principles, and context of each particular case. Id. at 1123 n.5. However, the ruling 
has effectively resulted in a per se result. 
 99. Id. 
 100. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 
1160 (D. Utah 2001) (quoting Warranty Deed at 1-3). 
 101. Id. at 1160 (quoting Special Warranty Deed at §1.3). 
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agreement to the contrary.102 However, the court took it upon itself in 
both Hawkins and First Unitarian to determine the nature of the property 
through a forum analysis, trying to determine what the intentions of the 
city were in creating the easement.103 
The result of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling is that there is no certainty for 
government entities when contracting to create easements to determine 
the scope of property rights, in particular easements. As the Tenth Circuit 
indicated, its intention was not to hold that the First Amendment applies 
to all easements, but that easements are open to scrutiny based upon the 
characteristics of the easement, forum principles, and context of each 
particular case.104 Though parties who feel their constitutional rights have 
been violated should be afforded a day in court, the Tenth Circuit’s 
ruling provides no safe-harbor for government entities to work within 
when reserving easements. Even if the government entity specifically 
outlines in the Reservation of Deed of Easement that nothing more than 
“pedestrian access and passage” are intended, 105 the government must 
await a ruling from the courts to determine whether its intentions will be 
upheld. Parties, therefore, are left to the determination of the court. In the 
process of trumping settled state law, the Tenth Circuit has failed to 
outline what government entities can do to guarantee pedestrian access 
while not encroaching on the servient estate’s rights.106 By not honoring 
the express statements in the Reservation of Deed, the Tenth Circuit 
leaves both the government entity and buyer of property with uncertainty 
whether their intentions will be honored. Thus, the ruling undermines the 
government’s ability to plan and utilize public land to maximize the 
public good. 
It is settled Utah Law that a servient estate should only be burdened 
to the extent of the deed,107 for to deem otherwise would diminish 
individual ability to contract. As Judge Stewart noted, the Church should 
not be penalized for paying fair market value for burdened property108 
 
 102. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122-1123 (10th Cir. 
2002). 
 103. The Supreme Court has indicated that a government entity can create a designated public 
forum. See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citing United States 
Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)). 
 104. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1123 n.5. 
 105. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 
1160 (D. Utah 2001). 
 106. See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1131. (The Tenth Circuit stated that if the City 
wanted to retain an easement “the City must permit speech on the easement. Otherwise, it must 
relinquish the easement so the parcel becomes entirely private.” In effect, the Tenth Circuit has 
stated that First Amendment considerations trump government entities’ rights when contracting for 
easements across private land.) 
 107. See supra note 44. 
 108. Walsh, supra note 10, at A1. 
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because it was not the intent of the City or the Church to extend the 
easement beyond “pedestrian access and passage.”109 The Church would 
not have purchased Main Street had it known it would be unable to 
maintain the same restrictions as it does upon the rest of its Church 
campus which flanks Main Street.110 The Tenth Circuit provides no 
convincing argument to support the proposition that First Amendment 
rights automatically trump a government agency’s right to contract the 
scope of the forum in a reservation of deeds. The court simply stated that 
if there is unconstitutional action, then the property right should be 
eliminated or changed into a form that is not unconstitutional.111 The 
court then incorrectly classified the Plaza as a public forum and thereby 
invalidated the express language of the deed as a violation of free speech.  
By doing so, the court trumped state property rights and diminished the 
government’s ability to contract, all under the banner of the First 
Amendment. 
2. The former public forum was eliminated with a non-public forum 
taking its place 
Even if the notion that the government cannot limit the scope of the 
easement by deed is rejected, the Court still erred in its forum analysis. It 
is not disputed that before Main Street was sold it was a public forum.112 
The dispute centers around whether the three prongs of Justice 
Kennedy’s test have been satisfied: that of selling the property, changing 
the property’s physical characteristics, and/or changing the property’s 
principle use.113 
a. Selling the property. In the Hawkins case, the city retained control 
over the entire plaza thus not selling or conveying any rights to a third 
party.114 In Hotel Employees, the city retained the rights to Lincoln Plaza 
but allowed a third party corporation, Lincoln Center Inc., to maintain 
the premises, including the scheduling of events.115 Clearly in both of 
these instances the first prong of Justice Kennedy’s analysis has not been 
 
 109. First Unitarian, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. 
 110. Transcript, Salt Lake City Planning Commission Meeting, March 4, 1999 at 45. (on file 
with author) (Church attorney stated that it was crucial to the Church to protect the interests on the 
adjoining Church properties). 
 111. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1122. 
 112. First Unitarian, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1165. 
 113. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698-700 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 114. Brief for Appellee at 6-7, First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, en banc denied. 
 115. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Parks 
&Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 541 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
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met, that of selling the property, yet both these Courts determined that a 
non-public forum exists. 
b. Changing the property’s physical characteristics. The Tenth Circuit 
limited its review of the physical characteristics and property’s principle 
use to that of the easement rather than examining the characteristics of 
the servient estate (the Plaza now owned by the Church).  The court 
states “it is the purpose of the easement, the property that is a forum of 
some type, and not the purpose of the Church Plaza, the surrounding 
property, that is at issue.”116 However, it is clear from both Hawkins and 
Hotel Employees that in the interest of completeness both interests of the 
servitude and servient owners need to be addressed. In Hawkins, the 
court did not limit its analysis to individuals’ ability to cross, or “cut 
through” the plaza, but examined the nature of the DPAC as a whole.117 
Again in Hotel Employees, the court looked at the characteristics of the 
entire Lincoln Complex. By limiting the analysis to a non-possessory 
interest such as the easement alone, it is clear that no physical 
characteristics can be ascertained.  The court was, therefore, able to 
avoid meeting the second prong of the Kennedy test. The court simply 
stated that the easement has many similarities to a sidewalk that has 
traditionally been held to be a public forum.118 However, the court should 
not just make a broad characterization of all easements as maintaining 
the same physical characteristics as sidewalks. There are numerous 
examples of easements that do not constitute sidewalks such as running 
utility lines across individuals’ property. It is necessary to look at the 
easement in light of its surroundings to properly balance First 
Amendment and private property rights. 
Upon examining the changes that have taken place on Main Street, it 
is clear that a “special type of enclave” has been established.119 The 
Church, at its own expense, removed the street and sidewalks. The 
Church’s name is conspicuously displayed on all entrances, there are 
many religious sculptures and images presented, and there is a large 
reflecting pool in front of the LDS temple.120 No remnants of the former 
sidewalk or street exist. Instead, “reddish-grey granite pavers” now cover 
the Plaza.121 Additionally, the Church placed streetlights and garbage 
cans on the Plaza that are identical to those on the surrounding church 
 
 116. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1128. 
 117. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 6-7. 
 118. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1129. 
 119. Hotel Employees, 311 F.3d at 550 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 
(1983). 
 120. Brief for Appellee, supra at note 114, at 3. 
 121. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 
1167 (D. Utah 2001). 
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campus.122 These changes indicate that this Plaza is not a public property 
but an ecclesiastical park that serves as an extension of the Church’s 
downtown religious campus with the Church’s Temple and World 
Headquarters flanking the Plaza.123 
The changes made on Main Street Plaza are consistent with those 
made on the Galleria in Hawkins. The Tenth Circuit court, however, 
argues that the nature of the property in Hawkins was changed because 
the street dead-ended into a park and not because a public street was 
converted into a 600-foot glass Galleria.124 However, the term dead end 
is never mentioned in the Hawkins decision125 and the court in Hawkins 
looked at physical changes to the entire DPAC.126 By ignoring the vast 
physical changes made on the Plaza, the Tenth Circuit has ignored the 
Hawkins precedent. 
c.  Changing the property’s principle use.  The main thrust of the 
Tenth Circuit’s analysis focuses on the third prong of Justice Kennedy’s 
test, though one prong of the analysis should carry no more weight than 
any other prong.127 The notion that the property’s principle use should be 
limited to that of a public thoroughfare rather than the use for which the 
Church purchased the property is improper and both the City and 
Church’s purpose behind the Plaza should be examined. 
The First Unitarian court distinguishes Hawkins by arguing that the 
main purpose of the Galleria was for ingress and egress into the DPAC128 
and that the Plaza’s main purpose is for pedestrian traffic.129 From the 
language of the deed it is clear that the City and Church did not intend 
for anything more than mere “pedestrian access and passage”130 across 
the Plaza: otherwise the reservation would not specify that “[n]othing in 
the reservation of use of this easement shall be deemed to create or 
constitute a public forum.”131 The court implicitly refutes the specific 
intention of the deed to restrict certain activities by stating that the City 
first proposed that speech on the Plaza should not be more restrictive 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. See supra note 75 (the Tenth Circuit in Hawkins noted that the mere crossing of the plaza 
by pedestrians does not mean that a public forum exists). 
 124. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1130. 
 125. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 7. 
 126. Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 127. Id. at 1287 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 
686 (1992)). 
 128. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1127. 
 129. Id. at 1128. 
 130. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 
1167 (D. Utah 2001) (quoting Warranty Deed at 1-3). 
 131. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1118-1119 (quoting Aplt. App. Vol II at 362). 
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than a public park.132 However, this proposal came up during a planning 
commission meeting in which an individual suggested, after approving of 
the proposed Plaza, that restrictions should not be greater than a public 
park.133 But this proposal was simply part of the Planning Commission’s 
recommendation to the City Council and was not adopted in the final 
agreement approved by the City Council.134 As in Hotel Employees, if 
something is not adopted as official policy of the governing body then it 
should not constitute a legal conclusion.135 A mere discussion should not 
be used to trump the unambiguous language of the deed showing that 
nothing more than passage was intended. 
The court also stated that “but for” the easement the City would not 
have entered into the agreement with the Church.136 Statements made by 
Salt Lake City attorney Roger Cutler to the ACLU showed that, for the 
City, the sale of the property was never contingent on the easement. 
Cutler stated that, if forced to choose, “the [C]ity would elect to deed the 
easement to the purchaser, rather than face a remitter of all or any of the 
purchase price because of a claim of recession or deed reformation due to 
a mistake of fact and/or law on the forum status of this property.”137 The 
result would be the City would give up any rights it had to the Plaza.138 It 
was also recognized that the City asked for the easement to appease 
critics who thought that the Church might not allow individuals to cross 
the Plaza, 139 not because City leaders’ felt “there was a legitimate need 
for the easement.”140 This also refutes the contention that the reverter 
clause was in place to guarantee the rights of the citizens. It was instead 
intended only to appease certain critics to the Plaza, not as an indication 
of the main purpose of the Plaza as a pedestrian thoroughfare. The Tenth 
Circuit even acknowledged that the “City has attempted to change the 
forum’s status”141 as the “City Council knew, understood, and acquiesced 
in the terms of a limited public access easement, including the fact that it 
was not to constitute or be used as a public forum.”142 It is clear that the 
 
 132. Id. at 1128. 
 133. Transcript, Salt Lake City Planning Comm’n Meeting, supra note 110, at 37. 
 134. Transcript, Salt Lake City Council Meeting, April 13 1999 at 78-79. 
 135. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Parks 
&Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 549 (2nd Cir. 2002) 
 136. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1126. 
 137. Letter from Roger F. Cutler, City Attorney for the City of Salt Lake, to Stephen C. Clark 
of the American Civil Liberties Union of Utah Found., Inc. (June 9, 1999). 
 138. Brady Snyder, Letters Dispute Plaza Stance, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 27, 2002, at A1. 
 139. Letter from Roger F. Cutler to Stephen C. Clark, supra note 137. 
 140. Brady Snyder, supra note 138, at A01. 
 141. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1131. 
 142. Letter from Roger F. Cutler, City Attorney for the City of Salt Lake, to Stephen C. Clark 
of the American Civil Liberties Union of Utah Found., Inc. (May 17, 1999). 
10MONTIERTH.MACRO 5/26/2004  1:12 AM 
709] SALT LAKE CITY MAIN STREET PLAZA 727 
main purpose of the Plaza was not to increase the pedestrian flow of 
traffic, but as an extension of the Church’s campus and ingress and 
egress to the Church’s facilities. 
The court reasoned that because the City and the Church planned for 
and encouraged public use, the main purpose of the Plaza was for 
pedestrian ingress and egress across the Plaza and not ingress and egress 
to Church facilities flanking the Plaza.143 The court, in making such a 
conclusion, was clearly not examining the actual use of the Plaza. In fact, 
the Salt Lake transportation board noted that the majority of people who 
utilize Main Street Plaza do so to access adjacent church buildings144 and 
if there was no easement across the Plaza the impact on pedestrian travel 
would be minimal as individuals would have to travel only an extra one-
third of a mile.145 It was estimated that between 19,000 and 30,000 
individuals utilize the Plaza to reach Church owned properties daily as 
opposed to a much more minimal amount that actually walk through the 
property.146 The Plaza can be compared to Lincoln Plaza in the fact that 
the public can “wander through the [C]hurch [P]laza, but most go there 
as a destination or to get to other [C]hurch buildings”147 as people can 
wander through Lincoln Plaza, but go there to access the entertainment 
and artistic facilities. 
In summary, the Tenth Circuit felt that “the district court erred in 
considering whether speech activities were compatible with an 
‘ecclesiastical park.’ Providing for a religious park is the purpose of the 
surrounding Plaza property, not the easement, and must be the Church’s 
purpose, rather than the [C]ity’s.”148 In speaking during the approving 
phases of the Plaza, Church President Gordon B. Hinckley stated “[t]his 
beautiful place will inspire faith where now there is asphalt and moving 
cars.”149 Clearly, however, it was not only the Church’s desire to create a 
“beautiful place” downtown; the City also recognized the value of the 
Church’s Plaza.  Salt Lake City Council Chairman Bryce Jolley stated, 
“[e]verything will be improved with that plaza. . . . It not only improves 
the landscape and architecture around there, but it [also] brings more 
 
 143. First Unitarian, 308 F.3d at 1126-27. 
 144. Heather May, Advisory Board Backs City’s Plaza Plan, SALT LAKE TRIB., March 5, 
2003, at B2. 
 145. Heather May, Take the Deal, Abandon Easement on Plaza, SALT LAKE TRIB., April 5, 
2003, at B5. 
 146. Rebecca Walsh, Fight Over Main Street Plaza Down to Meaning of ‘Sidewalk’, SALT 
LAKE TRIB., Dec. 19, 2000, at B2. 
 147. Heather May, Sides in Plaza Suit Eye NYC Case, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec.14, 2002, at B1. 
 148. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1128 
n.10 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 149. Rebecca Walsh, New Plaza Proposed on Main, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec 2, 1998, at A1. 
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people to downtown Salt Lake City, building the business community, 
restaurants, retailers and hotels.”150 The City was not in a position to 
accomplish this and so it solicited the Church to create the downtown 
Plaza as an extension of its campus.151 
B.  Implications of Classifying a Public Forum: The Burden on 
Government Entities’ Ability to Sell Public Land and Maximize Public 
Good 
As the preamble to the Constitution points out, one of the underlying 
purposes of government is to “promote the general welfare” of its 
citizens.152 In fulfilling this charge, government entities often sell public 
land to generate revenue to foster the public good.153 The Tenth Circuit’s 
ruling limits government entities to two options when selling public 
land.154 The first option is selling the land unencumbered. While doing so 
generates fair market value for the land, it denies any possible future 
public access to the land. The costs associated with selling the land are 
also increased as leery buyers spend extra time and effort to make sure 
the land is unencumbered. These increased costs are not only assumed by 
the buyers but also passed onto government entities desiring to sell the 
land. 
Alternatively, public land can be sold with an easement at a deeply 
discounted price. This discount results from the buyer giving up a stick 
in their bundle of property rights, the right to exclude others. This option 
however limits revenue that could be utilized in other areas to maximize 
the public good. In either case, the ruling deprives states and individuals 
the ability to negotiate and determine the scope of the easement that best 
benefits both parties. 
Not only is government’s ability to sell land burdened, its ability to 
gain access across private individual’s lands is now hindered in the Tenth 
 
 150. Id. See also Mayor Ross C. “Rocky” Anderson, Regarding Main Street Plaza Proposal, 
Dec. 6, 2002 available at http://www.slcgov.com/mayor/speeches/ 
Main%20Street%20Plaza%20Solution%20Proposal% 20Speech.htm (Salt Lake City Mayor Rocky 
Anderson stated, “Salt Lake City government has a significant interest in preserving the beautiful, 
peaceful setting provided by the Main Street Plaza. Not only do millions of tourists visit the area 
each year, but also many Downtown workers and residents seek respite at the Plaza each day.”). 
 151. Rebecca Walsh, Main Street Closure Ready for Approval,, SALT LAKE TRIB., April 3, 
1999, at D1 (Salt Lake City Planning Director Bill Wright stating that City did not have money to 
build the plaza as “[i]t’s a very expensive proposition to build a plaza like this and maintain it.”). 
 152. U.S. Const. pmbl. 
 153. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-2(1)(c)(2003) (city governments may “purchase, receive, hold, 
sell, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the benefit of the municipality, 
whether the property is within or without the municipality’s corporate boundaries”). 
 154. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the States of Utah, Alabama, Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, and 
West Virginia, Corporation of the Presiding Bishopric of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City cert. denied (No. 02-1350). 
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Circuit. Governments often negotiate with private individuals to gain 
access to public land, beaches, and state hiking trails.155 Landowners will 
not grant easements for public use if there is a possibility their property 
will become a public forum. The Utah Attorney General, in an amicus 
brief on behalf of several states, argued that 
[P]roperty owners would be most reluctant to allow easements on their 
property, particularly easements in favor of a government. Disregarding 
the plain terms of the easement . . . impos[es] a disruptive public forum 
on the Church Plaza. This is obviously a significant intrusion into the 
City’s prerogative to dispose of its own property as it sees fit. But it is 
also an enormous intrusion into the State’s authority to establish 
property-law principles that will best serve the interests of the State and 
its citizens.156 
State governments in the Tenth Circuit are now faced with the challenge 
of determining what servitudes they have already retained by deed that 
violate the First Amendment. The ruling of First Unitarian has opened 
up the door for other public servitudes to be deemed invalid.  Under 
settled state law, easements should only be utilized to the extent of “the 
public purpose for which the easement was obtained,”157 and, in the 
current case, the limitation was just for pedestrian passage. Regardless of 
the intentions of the parties, terms of the easement, and the abridgment of 
property rights the “First Amendment automatically injects an 
irrevocable public forum clause in most government-owned public 
access easements. To be sure, the court of appeals stated that it’s holding 
did not mean that every easement creates a public forum.”158 Under the 
Tenth circuit ruling: 
[T]he result is extraordinary: even if the physical appearance and 
primary use of a property have changed drastically, even if the property 
has been sold for fair market value, and even if there are no identified 
persons who will use the property as a thoroughfare, a public forum 
will nevertheless exist any time a hypothetical person has the legal 
ability to walk across that property.159 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. S.O.C., Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d 243, 247-48 (Nev. 2001) (“[E]xistence of [a 
pedestrian access] easement alone, without more, does not transform private property into a public 
forum”). 
 158. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 154, at 9-10. 
 159. Brief for Appellee, supra note 114, at 8. 
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C.  First Unitarian Provides an Example of Unduly Burdening Public 
Land 
The problems associated with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling are evident 
in the Main Street Plaza case. Salt Lake City began talking with the 
Church over forty years earlier in an attempt to revitalize downtown 
through turning Main Street into an extension of the Church’s downtown 
campus.160 The purpose of the Plaza was to foster beauty and create 
harmony to the City’s main tourist attraction; the Church’s Temple 
Square and office building complex that straddle Main Street. It is argued 
that annually more than nine million tourists visit the Church’s complex 
downtown, generating a significant portion of the downtown economy. 
During these talks, the Church made it clear that if the restrictions that 
existed on its adjoining properties could not be imposed on the Main 
Street Plaza, they would not enter into the deal. The City was never in a 
position to turn the street into a park but relied upon the sale to the 
Church to accomplish this goal. If the First Unitarian opinion were in 
place during the Church and City’s negotiations, inevitably the Main 
Street Plaza would never have been erected. The City and its citizens 
would have lost a valuable downtown asset that consequently fulfilled 
the purpose of increasing pedestrian traffic in addition to the revenue 
generated through the sale. 
As Nancy Workman, the Salt Lake County Mayor, pointed out: 
Surely, the [C]hurch did not spend over $8 million to buy a piece of 
property to serve as a platform for behavior it finds objectionable . . . . 
No private entity would enter into a transaction such as that, so why 
should the church be expected to? Let’s be fair. And let’s recognize the 
value the plaza has added to our community.161 
Additionally, nobody yet knows how far reaching the Tenth Circuit 
ruling will be as the Main Street Plaza “public easement isn’t the only 
right of way through private property in Salt Lake City.162 Other 
easements are found crossing another Church owned property, a 
downtown housing project, an outdoor shopping mall, and the back yards 
of individuals.163 Two other easement contracts in particular contain 
many of the same provisions in the Main Street Plaza reservation.164 The 
Tenth Circuit ruling effectively opens the door for “those hostile to 
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[private organizations] to forcibly open [private] church grounds, 
gardens, camps, cemeteries, retreat centers and other private property for 
antagonistic demonstrations and marches.”165 There is no certain way, 
when contracting with a government entity for an easement across 
private property, to avoid creating a public forum. 
D.  Resolution of the Easement Issue and the Continued Debate 
The Tenth Circuit suggested that one solution to the problem would 
be to eliminate the public easement.166 Accordingly, Salt Lake City and 
the Church reached a settlement agreement where the Church bought the 
rights to the easement for close to five million dollars in cash and land.167 
This result is ironic in two ways. First, the Church, a fair market 
purchaser, ended up paying more than fair market value and construction 
costs to build a Plaza whose main purpose, identified by the Tenth 
Circuit, was to increase the City’s pedestrian flow - - not for an 
Ecclesiastical Park. Secondly, at the end of the day the City was willing 
to give up what supposedly the Tenth Circuit argued was the City’s 
purpose in the Plaza, that of an easement. 
But this settlement agreement has not ended the controversy. On 
August 3, 2003 the First Unitarian Church voted unanimously to file 
another lawsuit. The underlying arguments in this new lawsuit is that the 
city selling the right of way across the Plaza violated individuals First 
amendment rights as well “as the ban on endorsement of religion found 
in the U.S. and Utah constitutions.”168 The suit claims that President 
Gordon B. Hinckley used religious code to improperly influence city 
councilmen to vote for the selling of the easement and that Mayor Rocky 
Anderson yielded to the Church’s influence in order to “shore up his 
flagging support” on the west side of the City where the Church gave 
property to the City.169 However, as an editorial noticed 
[t]he irony is too rich to ignore. Before casting a vote Sunday over 
whether to sue Salt Lake City for selling its public easement on the 
Main Street Plaza, leaders of the First Unitarian Church expelled 
everyone who isn’t a member of the congregation. Even the media had 
to wait outside in silence for nearly two hours until the vote . . . was 
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made known. Wait a second. Does this mean churches do have a right 
to suspend First Amendment rights on their own property? Well, of 
course they do.170 
The ongoing dispute over the Plaza typifies the real dispute in First 
Unitarian, the underlying tensions over the Church’s influence in Salt 
Lake City. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Whether the restrictions placed upon the Plaza would survive the 
non-public forum reasonableness standard is unclear and not addressed 
in this Note. Regardless of the tension between the Church and other 
factions, one thing is certain from the Tenth Circuits ruling, by ignoring 
the intent of the parties through the deed of reservation and by limiting 
its analysis of the Plaza only to the easement, the court incorrectly 
classified the Main Street Plaza as a public forum and has created 
uncertainty within Tenth Circuit property law. The right to exclude 
others might be included in the bundle of property rights, but in the 
Tenth Circuit, private property owners subject to government regulation 
and servitudes best beware. 
Braden J. Montierth 
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